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ORIGINALISM, CONSERVATISM, AND JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT
DAVID

A. STRAUSS*

"Judicial restraint" is not a well-defined term. Sometimes it is
just an all-purpose term of praise for judges who have reached
decisions that the speaker likes, in the same way that "judicial
activism" is often an epithet used for decisions that the speaker
dislikes.' But it might be possible to give at least some minimum content to "judicial restraint." Let's say that, at a mini-

mum, "restrained" judges are careful about not letting their
views of policy or morality displace the law.

If you believe in judicial restraint in that sense, then you should
not be an originalist. You should firmly reject originalism, at least
in the form in which most self-identified originalists today define
it.2

Instead, you should adopt a view that emphasizes the role of

precedent in constitutional law. I'll go further. Whatever judicial

restraint means, if you are a conservative today, you should be
deeply skeptical of originalism. Instead, you should be receptive
3
to a precedent-based view of constitutional law.

*Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This Essay is adapted from remarks I delivered on February 27, 2010, at the
Twenty-Ninth Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am grateful to the Sonnenschein Fund at
the University of Chicago Law School for financial support.
1. Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder, So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2005, at A19 ("[Tihe word 'activist' is rarely defined. Often it simply means that
the judge makes decisions with which the critic disagrees.").
2. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
856-57 (1989) (discussing how to apply originalism).
3. See David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn't Be Originalists,31 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 969, 969 (2008) (arguing that "conservatives [should] abandon their
allegiance to originalism and instead adopt an approach to constitutional interpretation that is based in precedent").
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There is a paradox here. 4 A couple of generations ago, many
people would have thought it obvious, true almost by definition, that both judicial restraint and conservatism mean adherence to precedent. Precedent keeps judges from going off in a
direction of their own choosing;5 cut judges loose from precedent, and you invite unrestrained adjudication. As for conservatism, precedent is a matter of adhering to what has gone
before, of conserving what has been done in the past. So, according to a common definition of conservatism, 6 adherence to
precedent should be a core conservative view. Today, there are
conservatives who would say that adhering to tradition is not
the core of conservatism. 7 Even for conservatives who take that
view, though, originalism, at least today, is a bad match.
Let me begin by addressing originalism and explaining why
originalism is not a viable alternative to a precedent-based approach. This is true at least for an originalist approach to our
Constitution, because nearly all of the controversial provisions
of our Constitution are very old. If we were dealing with newer
constitutions, or newly enacted constitutional provisions,
originalism would be more defensible. But nearly all the provisions of our Constitution that generate controversy were
adopted either in the aftermath of the Civil War or earlier, as
part of the original Constitution or in amendments adopted in
8
its wake, like the Bill of Rights.
For a constitution like ours, there are at least two principal
problems with originalism. These are familiar criticisms of
originalism, but I do not think they have been answered satisfac4. Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 273 (2005) ("Judicial restraint is generally
thought to be a conservative value, yet most conservative constitutional law
scholars today seem to favor a weak theory of precedent.").
5. See, e.g., id. at 276-78 (discussing how precedent promotes the equal treatment
of litigants across cases by judges and requires judges not to bend the rules).
6. See, e.g., BARRY GOLDWATER, THE CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE 6 (1960) ("The
Conservative approach is nothing more or less than an attempt to apply the wisdom
and experience and the revealed truths of the past to the problems of today.").
7. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically CorruptingInfluence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005).
8. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, The 39th Congress (1865-1867) and the 14th Amendment: Some PreliminaryPerspectives, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1019, 1019 (2009) ("The 14th
Amendment is the basis of more litigation than all the other provisions of the
Constitution.").
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torily. The first is the problem of ascertaining the "original understandings," the original public meanings, or whatever historical fact or condition an originalist is supposed to ascertain. 9
However originalism is conceived, this is essentially a project in
intellectual history: it calls for trying to reconstruct what people
who lived in an earlier time thought about their world. 10
Intellectual history is a valuable and important discipline,
but it is also a discipline that, by its nature, leaves a lot of questions unsettled. Intellectual historians disagree among themselves about the best way to understand the ideas of earlier
generations.1 But perhaps more important for purposes of constitutional law, intellectual historians have the incalculable advantage of being able to choose their own battles. They can
decide what period they want to try to understand, and which
issues within that period. A judge cannot do that. 2
Suppose, for example, that a historian wanted to analyze
how people in an earlier era talked about a constitutional issue.
She would examine public statements, public records, and the
like-the kinds of materials that originalists say should be the
sources of constitutional law. 3 But suppose that the historian,
after examining those materials carefully and sympathetically,
decides that she just cannot make head or tail of the intellectual
currents of that period. The people back then seem to have
been confused. Enough of them agreed on what the language
of the Constitution should be, but among those who agreed on
the language, there were many different accounts of what was
9. Strauss, supra note 3, at 970-71.
10. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 2, at 856-57 ("[Originalism] requires immersing
oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time-somehow placing
out of mind knowledge that we have which an earlier age did not, and putting on
beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our day.
It is, in short, a task sometimes better suited to the historian than the lawyer.").
11. William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (1997)
("[Dlisputes over [intellectual historical methodologies] are sharper now than ever.").
12. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, d. 1; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356
(1911) ("[T]he exercise of the judicial power is limited to 'cases' and 'controversies.' Beyond this it does not extend, and unless it is asserted in a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution, the power to exercise it is nowhere
conferred.").
13. See e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1493-95 (2005) (directing originalists to refer
to eighteenth-century newspapers, dictionaries, judicial opinions, and the like
when interpreting a constitutional clause enacted in the late 1780s).
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actually going on. The people had different ideas of what the
Constitution should accomplish. No coherent approach to the
issue emerges from the historical materials.
In these circumstances a historian can just walk away. She
can decide to spend her time and energy understanding some
other period or some other issue. But a judge cannot do that.
The judge has to decide the case before him. That makes the
originalist project a particularly difficult, challenging form of
intellectual history and one that often will, to the honest
originalist, turn up the answer "I don't know," or "there were
various ideas and none clearly prevailed," or "they were just
confused back then." That is one difficulty with originalism.
Too often, it will be just too hard to figure out the answers to
the relevant historical questions.
The second problem, which is even more severe, is what you
might call the problem of adaptation or translation.14 Suppose we
have a very clear idea of what people in an earlier generation
were thinking when they adopted the First, Second, Fourth, or
Fourteenth Amendment. Still, their understanding pertained to
their world-they were adopting the constitutional provision for
the world in which they lived. It is fanciful to suppose that
Americans would have had a clear understanding, in the late
eighteenth or mid-nineteenth century, about our twenty-first century world-a world that would have been, to them, in every way
wildly hypothetical, and in some respects literally inconceivable. 15
So an originalist somehow has to adapt or translate the
original understandings or original meanings to our world.
Does the "freedom of speech" mentioned in the First Amendment include the freedom to make and show movies? You
might say that it is obvious that the First Amendment extends
to movies, and, under current law, it does. 16 But why does the
First Amendment include movies? Because the original understanding was that it applied to movies? "What's a movie?," the
Founders would have said, when they adopted the First
14. Strauss, supra note 3, at 971-72.
15. Id. at 972; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) ("What the constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be the measure to
the vision of our time. Similarly, what those fundamentals mean for us, our descendants will learn, cannot be the measure to the vision of their time.").
16. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).

No. 1] Originalism,Conservativism, and JudicialRestraint

141

Amendment. You might say that protecting movies serves the
purposes of the First Amendment. But once you start talking
about purposes that way, you have gone beyond originalism,
at least if originalism is supposed to provide any limits at all.
An originalist who invokes purposes in that way could argue,
for example, that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to promote equality, so the Constitution requires the redistribution of wealth-or, if you prefer, that the purpose of the
Just Compensation Clause was to protect private property from
government interference, so it is unconstitutional for the state
to (insert your least-favorite form of regulation here).
The Fourth Amendment protects people's persons, houses,
17
papers, and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Do wireless communications fall within that phrase? Wireless
communications are not literally persons, houses, papers or effects. Should they nonetheless be treated as papers or effects?
How do we determine the original understanding on that issue?
Do we imagine a hypothetical eighteenth-century conversation
about whether the "public meaning" of "persons, houses, papers, and effects" includes wireless communications? If so, with
whom? A typical member of the eighteenth-century public? An
especially well-informed member of the eighteenth-century public? A clairvoyant member of the eighteenth-century public who
knew all about cell phones? How are we going to determine
how that conversation comes out? And do we really want the
law to depend on every judge's reconstruction of that imaginary
conversation-possibly subject to reversal when another judge
reconstructs it differently, because, according to some original18
ists at least, precedent does not matter?
These are familiar problems, and originalists have come up
with various interesting and creative ways of dealing with them. 19
But I do not think originalists have not been able to mitigate the
exceptionally open-ended and speculative nature of these inquiries. What's more, these problems are endemic, not episodic. Developments in electronic communication are one example, but the
problem is not limited to technological innovation. The same
problem, in principle, applies to economic, demographic, and so17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 7.
19. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text,
Precedent,and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635 (2006).
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cial changes too. For example, if an issue arises under the Commerce Clause, we are confronted right away with that fact that the
nation-vastly larger in area and population, vastly more interconnected, vastly more complex commercially and financially-is
very different from the nation of 200-plus years ago.20 Original
understandings of the extent of the power to regulate commerce
among the states (in view of the Necessary and Proper Clause), or
the original meanings of those clauses, would also have to be
21
adapted to or translated for current circumstances.
Why do these problems matter to an advocate of judicial restraint, or to a conservative? They matter because even if people are approaching the original materials with perfect good
faith, many different originalist conclusions will all seem plausible, and there will be no criteria that dictate a choice among
them.22 At that point, some originalists do something that
seems to me like conceding defeat: They say that originalist
"interpretation" should be used only when the original materials provide a relatively certain answer. When the original materials are unclear, a judge should engage not in "interpretation,"
but in "construction."2 3 Construction requires resorting to things
like precedent and policy. But in most cases controversial
enough to generate disagreement, let alone litigation, the original materials will not be so clear, even assuming that clarity is
possible in principle -a heroic assumption, in my view, in light
of the difficulties of translation. So construction will be the dayto-day rule in constitutional law. And that means that constitutional law, whenever issues are difficult, will depend on precedent and policy, not originalist materials.
There is a deeper problem, though. If the original materials
are routinely murky, the purportedly originalist interpreter

20. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 23 (2010).

21. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (reaffirming
that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants legislative authority to implement a
statute when it "constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power").
22. Compare McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 358 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (determining, after an originalist analysis, that an
Ohio election law was inconsistent with the First Amendment), with id. at 371
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (determining, also after an originalist analysis, that the Ohio
election law was consistent with the First Amendment).
23. See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with OriginalMeaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 263-66 (2005).
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will be tempted to read his or her own views into them.24 This
need not be a matter of bad faith. There is a natural tendency
for any interpreter to think that the founding generations were
composed of smart, sensible people, like-well, the interpreter
himself.2 5 It is very difficult, when the historical materials are
unclear, not to see things through one's own eyes. If judicial
restraint means abjuring one's own views in favor of the law,
then originalist interpretation is, contrary to its claims, an open
invitation to be unrestrained.
These problems with originalism are very severe-so severe
that they generally disqualify originalism as a way of deciding
controversial cases. Then the question becomes: Why do people
still profess to be originalists, if originalism does not do the work
it purports to do? One answer is that originalism is a rhetorical
device. 26 Rhetoric is important, and people in public office, including judges and justices, legitimately use rhetorical devices to
accomplish their objectives. Originalism, in particular, can be an
especially valuable rhetorical device in one particular setting: to
attack the status quo. The two most prominent originalists of the
last hundred years-Justice Black and Justice Scalia-were both

trying to sweep away what they saw as an established but mis27
taken approach to the Constitution.
Justice Black was trying to overturn the legacy of the preNew Deal Court, which had declared unconstitutional various
kinds of regulatory and redistributive legislation.28 Justice
Scalia is trying to sweep away, I think, certain elements of the
legacy of the Warren Court.29 When you are trying to get rid of
an established tradition, you cannot rely on precedent, obviously; precedent is the problem. So you need to offer an alterna24. See David A. Strauss, The Death of Judicial Conservatism, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1, 3-4 (2009).
25. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 974.
26. Id. at 975.
27. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737,
1754 (2007) (describing how Justice Scalia is engaged in an "effort... to challenge
the very notion of a living Constitution"); Strauss, supra note 3, at 975 (describing
how Justice Black "'used originalism ... to attack... the tradition of the pre-New
Deal Court").
28. Strauss, supra note 3, at 975.
29. JAMES B. STAAB, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: A
HAMILTONIAN ON THE SUPREME COURT 324 (2006) (labeling Scalia the Court's

"counterrevolutionary" because he seeks to return the law to original principles
and to "overturn many of the decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts").
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five. That is what originalism provides. It enables you to say: We
should get rid of the corrupt traditions that have built up and
return to the original, fundamental principles. 3° Perhaps the
greatest of all originalist movements-the Protestant Reformation-did exactly this.31 It attacked the existing order, the existing tradition, as corrupt and wrongheaded and called for a
return to the text and the original understandings.
Originalism is, therefore, in its essence, a destructive creed. It
does not provide answers. It gives you a way of challenging the
received wisdom. It is a way of getting rid of things. When you
want to rebuild, when you want to start building up a doctrine,
originalism does not really help you; it is too indeterminate.
That is when you have to resort to precedent.
This is why conservatives and advocates of judicial restraint
should reject originalism in favor of a precedent-based approach to the Constitution. Someone who believes in judicial
restraint should-at the very least-be skeptical of originalism,
because originalism is a way of opening things up, of getting
32
rid of the traditions and precedents that might limit judges.
Originalism substitutes historical materials that will routinely
be open-ended and that will invite the interpreter to inject his
own views. Precedent, by contrast, narrows things. Sometimes,
in routine cases, precedent dictates a certain choice. In cases
that reach the higher levels of the appellate system, precedent
often does not dictate a single choice; but even then, it narrows
things down. Precedent limits the outcomes that a judge can
reach in good faith and, unlike originalism, it often forecloses
the wholesale reexamination of an area of law. That is why, if
you favor judicial restraint, you should believe in precedent
and be wary of originalism.
What about conservatism, at least conservatism of the form
that is not, by definition, concerned with conserving the past? In
the last generation or so, the law has turned in a direction that is
much more appealing to many conservatives. 33 Increasingly, the
30. See, e.g., Edwin Meese 11, U.S. Att'y Gen., Speech before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), availableat http://www.fed-soc.org/resources/id49/default/asp.
31. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
32. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 278-82.
33. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding
that the Second Amendment's individual right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right incorporated against state and local governments); Citizens United v.
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accepted understanding, the governing tradition, is conservative. So if originalism is a way of getting rid of accepted understandings, one would expect to see conservatives moving away
from originalism. And who will the next wave of originalists be?
My bet is that they will be liberals or progressives. 34 Progressives
will be the ones trying to change things by invoking, rhetorically, fundamental principles and original understandings.
There is some evidence to support both of these speculations.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito do not seem to think of
themselves as originalists. 35 Their opinions generally draw on
precedent, shaped by their views of policy. When they want to
change the law, as the Court recently did in recasting First
Amendment limits on political expenditures, 6 they build the
foundations case by case; they do not simply invoke the text
and original understandings. They are essentially common
lawyers. They came of age, after all, in a period in which precedents were increasingly congenial to conservatives. They are
not interested in overthrowing the existing order. On the other
side, though we have not yet seen progressive originalists on
the Supreme Court, we do see them in the academy. 37 That is
what you would expect.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (reversing the Court's earlier prohibition on the use
of corporations' treasuries to make political expenditures as a violation of the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (holding that a racially informed school admissions system is unconstitutional); Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007)
(upholding the federal ban on partial birth abortion); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce).
34. See, e.g., Martha Neil, Progressive Originalism: 'Way More Liberal Than Conservative,' A.B.A. J. ONLINE (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/
progressive-originalism-way-more-liberal -than-conservative/.
35. See Jeffrey Rosen, Alito Vs. Roberts, Word by Word, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006
§ 4 (Week in Review), at 1, 3 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts as saying he "ha[s] no
overarching judicial philosophy"); Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., of New Jersey,
to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 465 (2006) ("[The Framers] didn't purport to
adopt a detailed code .... [T]hey left it for the courts [and] the legislative
body.., to apply that principle to the new situations that come up.").
36. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898-99 (declaring unconstitutional, under the
First Amendment, certain restrictions on corporate funding of political broadcasts).
37. For a synopsis of progressive originalism, see Jess Bravin, Rethinking Original
Intent, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2009, at W3. See also Jennifer Bradley & Doug Kendall,
Constitutional Craving: At long last, Democrats arefinally trying to reclaim the Constitu-
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Unlike, I suspect, most members of the Federalist Society, I
am sympathetic to the underlying views of some of those progressive originalists. But I do not think their originalism is the
right way to approach constitutional interpretation, and on that
point, at least, we ought to have some common ground. Today,
members of the Federalist Society -if they are conservative, or
if they believe in judicial restraint- should not be originalists,
either.

tion., THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE (Dec. 24, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www/tnr.com/
article/politics/constitutional-craving; Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, Liberal
Reading, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 6, 2007, at 14.

